
Human Behavior The Glue for a Sustainable Safety Culture





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Hadassah
Hebrew
University
Medical Center
Jerusalem
Israel





Please. Let me know my audience

A. Physicians

B. Nurses



C. Paramedical professions (Pharmacy, physiotherapy)



D. CEO

E. Important Other





Safety is a value Not a commodity





SAFETY is as simple as ABC
























































































During my stay in Singapore I took this short video observation





Then the king said, "one says, 'This is my son who is living, and your son is the dead one'; and the other says, 'No! For your son is the dead one, and my son is the living one." The king said, "Get me a sword." So they brought a sword before the king. The king said, "Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one and half to the other." Then the woman whose child was the living one spoke to the king, for she was deeply stirred over her son and said, "Oh, my lord, give her the living child, and by no means kill him." But the other said, "He shall be neither mine nor yours; divide him!"






B. F. Skinner



Skinner at the Harvard Psychology Department, c. 1950

B. F. Skinner



Skinner at the Harvard Psychology Department, c. 1950

THE MARSHMALLOW TEST

THE NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER

THINKING, FAST AND SLOW



DANIEL

WINNER OF THE NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS

"|A| masterpiece... This is one of the greatest and most engaging collections of insights into the framan mind? have read."—william eastwalk, Forential Times

→ **System 1**: fast, instinctive, is biased to believe and confirm, infers and invents exaggerates emotional consistency (halo effect)




→ **System 1**: fast, instinctive, is biased to believe and confirm, infers and invents exaggerates emotional consistency (halo effect)



→ **System 2:** slow, deliberate, rational, logical, relies on facts and knowledge







Thinking, Fast and Slow Daniel Kahneman

November 7th, 2011







SAFETY FIRST



For hospital safety you must wash your hands here





nere

ARIELY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIST & AUTHOR

TED×Midwest



Candid camera - Elevator

Memory

memory. all alone in the moonlight. i can smile at the old days, i was beautiful then i remember the time i knew what happiness was. let the memory live again





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A+



סוג דם החולה

ילדים אשפוז יום אונקולוגי

מס. מנה מרכיב # סוג

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מס. מנה מקורי: 3395534 ת. תפוגה: 96:23 21/11/2001

ת. הצלבה: 11:34 (28/10/2001 ת.

הצלבה מתאימה מאשר:

חתימות מאשרי מתן המנות (2 חתימות) שמור פתק זה בתיק החולה תאריך ושעת מתן הדם












WARNING This test must always be completed at the bedside BEFORE TRANSFUSION MEMO – 3 steps of testing: 1. Strict identification of the patient 2. Inspection of the blood 3. Check compatibility of patient and blood type Date / / Hour :
1. IDENTIFY THE PATIENT (mark √ in the ○) I have identified this patient: ○ By the bracelet tag ○ By personal recognition ○ By the patient's chart ○ By patient's details on the blood unit ○ By patient's details on blood type form NAME of PATIENT IDENTITY NO
2. INSPECTION OF THE BLOOD Color of the blood (no sign of infection, no turbidity, the unit is transparent when hemolytic) Date of expiry /
3. COMPATIBILITY CHECK OF PATIENT WITH BLOOD TYPE Comparison must be made and confirmed that: The blood type of the patient noted on the form is The blood type of the patient noted on the blood unit is The hospital blood unit number is The numbers noted on the form which is glued to the blood unit bag must be compared and checked with the numbers on the blood unit. O Type and Cross confirmed.
The blood unit has been checked and confirmed by – signatures: 1






5 Identification of patient according to patient's details on the blood unit6 Identification of patient according to patient's details on the blood type form.










Cause of death in the US


Is this an epidemic?



Unlike some epidemics, there is no specific treatment for error.
It is part of the human condition











CHEST

Transparency in Health Care

Preoperative Briefing in the Operating Room

Shared Cognition, Teamwork, and Patient Safety

Yael Einav, PhD; Daniel Gopher, PhD; Itzik Kara, RN, BSN, MHA; Orna Ben-Yosef, RN, BSN; Margaret Lawn, RN; Neri Laufer, MD; Meir Liebergall, MD; and Yoel Donchin, MD

Changing Culture

A New View of Human Error and Patient Safety

Organization, 13 their utilization remains relatively low

within many surgical specialties. This sluggishness of change is due to many reasons. One such reason is that physicians and other health-care providers are often not convinced that incorporating work-system tools and processes into their practice (eg, briefings or checklists) will have a significant enough impact on patient care to make changing their ways worth their PUBLIC RELEASE: 5-AUG-2016

Teamwork, communication training recommended to ensure surgical safety

Each member of the surgical team should be empowered to speak up and take responsibility for patient care



Surgical safety education programs with assessment of competence for surgeons, residents, medical students, perioperative team members, and surgical institutions on effective communication, resilience, leadership and teamwork.



Safety training modules (simulation-based) for the entire surgical team--doctors, nurses, anesthesiologists, surgical technicians and physician assistants.

Shared-decision making practices and procedures to ensure an informed and prepared surgical patient.

The value of 'gentle reminder' on safe medical behaviour

Ido Erev, Dotan Rodensky, Mark-Alain Levi, Michal Englard-Hershler, Hanna Admi, Yoel Donchin



Team E

It is important to wash hands

SAFETY FIRST



For hospital safety you must wash your hands here

It is important to wash hands, if you see someone from the team that is not following protocol –

Tell him **gentle** to use gloves etc.



Team G.



Team G.

It is important to wash hands, if you see someone from the team that is not following protocol – Tell him to use gloves etc.




Team E

It is important to wash hands

Nevertheless, a surprisingly simple and cheap intervention, the implementation of the 'gentle reminder' procedure, dramatically changed this behaviour. The observation did not influence the behaviour and in the 2 months during the war, where there were no observations at all, the behaviour stayed the same.

Safety is a value, not a commodity. It is not enough to add computers or sophisticated barcode reading in order to reduce the error rate. The way to achieve safety is by changing the behaviour of the human operator, as this is being called by human factors engineers. The current analysis shows that in certain cases, the 'gentle intervention' is sufficient to trigger a significant change.



Hyman G. Rickover





A behavior change method is any process that has the potential to influence psychological determinants.*

Examples of such determinants are attitude,

risk perception, self-efficacy, habit.

^{*} Education, Motivation, Skinner< Pavlov and more





safety climate

1: J Appl Psychol. 1980 Feb;65(1):96-102.

Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied implications.

Zohar D.





Culture of Safety

The utopian environment where medical errors do not occur because everyone is safetyconscious enough to avoid all mistakes.



The American social scientist Ron Westrum distinguished three kinds of safety culture the way in which an organization handles safety-related information.

Pathological organizations are liable to shoot the messenger and ignore or deny the information.






<u>Bureaucratic organizations:</u> listen to the message but do not necessarily know what it signifies. (New ideas often present problems)



Make changes, but do them only cosmetically





Ineffective Responses to A mishap

She was going to die anyway.

It is human to err.

It couldn't happen to me/here.

We need more/louder alarms.


They should always respond to alarms.

They should follow policies and procedures.

It's not their fault; it's the organization's fault.

Let's make sure this never happens again.

Blaming front-line operators



Generative (high-reliability) organizations welcome the messenger, even rewarding him or her, and treat the message very seriously.














we will start with a short movie









how do we go from







how do we steer safety away from





how do we steer safety away from









what **reason**

do we give people to be safe?



life is

complicated

enough









HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE

INSTRUCTIONS

This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and event reporting in your hospital and will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete.


- An "<u>event</u>" is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm.
- "<u>Patient safety</u>" is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries or adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery.


SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit

In this survey, think of your "unit" as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you spend *most* of your work time or provide *most* of your clinical services.


What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Mark ONE answer by filling in the circle.		
b. Medicine (non-surgical)c. Surgeryd. Obstetrics	g. Intensive care unit (any type)h. Psychiatry/mental healthi. Rehabilitation	I. Radiologym. Anesthesiologyn. Other, please specify:
e. Pediatricsf. Emergency department	○ j. Pharmacy○ k. Laboratory	

Mean Score of Safety Climate Ein Kerm and Mt Scopus











CHEST

Transparency in Health Care

Preoperative Briefing in the Operating Room

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Briefing Prior To Surgery

ALL team present

Nurse

- Patient name
- Operation
- Side of operation or incision
- Special patient information Medical history prosthesis

Anesthesiologist

- General, Regional, combined
- Drug Allergies
- Antibiotic coverage

Surgeon

Details of surgery

- Type of operation, approach
- Position
- Planned change in position
- Non routine activities
- Imaging and equip. positioning
- Special equipment

Argonbeam, Cryosurgery, optics, tourniquet

Medications

- Prior to start of surgery
- During surgery

Blood

- Ordered units
- Blood Type
- Transfusion equipment
- Units available in the OR

Pathology

- Planned frozen section
- Anticipated change based on results
- Planned specimens
- Receiving Laboratory



תוצאות

25% reduction in mishaps during surgery




Figure 3: Mean number of Non-Routine Events per operation with and without a briefing

Healthcare climate: A framework for measuring and improving patient safety*

Dov Zohar, PhD; Yael Livne, MSc; Orly Tenne-Gazit, MSc; Hanna Admi, PhD; Yoel Donchin, MD

Design: Measure organizational climate in nursing units, 101- the detrimental effect of poor hospital climate. Furthermore, cli-

Setting: Sixty-nine inpatient units in three hospitals that make up the entire tertiary care system in one metropolitan area. Subjects: A total of 955 nurses.

Interventions: None.

Measurements and Main Results: A two-part Nursing Climate Scale referring to hospital- and unit-level climates, followed by five randomly timed observations of patient safety practices covering routine and emergency care in each unit. Climate scales met the criteria of Internal reliability, within-unit agreement, and between-unit variability, using standard statistics of climate research. Both the hospital and unit nursing climates exhibited

lowed by random sampling of patient safety practices in each unit mate's strength increased its predictive power with regard to patient safety practices (Z = 3.64 for medication and 2.28 for emergency safety; p < .01). The small number of participating hospitals limits organization-level analyses.

Conclusions: The nursing climate identifies units where the likelihood of adverse events is greater or lower than the hospital's average. Such information can guide prevention efforts in selected units. These data encourage the development of additional climate subscales subsumed under the healthcare climate model

Key Words: safety culture; human factors engineering; nursing

ownership and accountability at all levels. zation-level change (5). Much of the ensuing action focused, however, on administrative and technical issues such as development of patient safety

*See also p. 1429.

From the Faculty of Management, Technion institute of Technology, Halfa, Israel (DZ, YL, OTG); Rambern Medical Center, Halfa, Israel (HA); and Hadassah Medical Center, Jerusalem, Israel (YD).

Supported, in part, by the Graduate School of the Technion institute of Technology and by the Research Center for Human Factors and Occupational Safety,

The authors have not disclosed any potential con-

For information regarding this article, E-mail: dzohar@tx.technion.ac.il Copyright @ 2007 by the Society of Critical Care

DOI: 10.1097/01.CCM.0000262404.10203.C9

Medicine and Lippincott Williams & Wilkins

he last decade, starting with chology principles (1-4). The bigger orgalook several unique attributes of healththe 1996 Annenberg Confer- nizational framework has been largely left care organizations, which are taken into ence, witnessed repeated calls out. However, disappointing results of the consideration in the scale we developed. for improving patient safety by patient safety movement reiterate the need First, patient safety must be differentireplacing individual blame with greater to augment current activities with organiated from staff safety, since manage-

"safety climate" was first used to improve a separate patient safety scale has to be units and redesign of systems and jobs ac-shown by us that whenever the safety the hospital, since their managements' cording to ergonomic and cognitive psy- climate level was high in a variety of priorities (which underlie organizational safety mishaps and absence days from should be conceived as a cluster of prowork was minimal (6, 7).

> The concept of safety climate represents shared employee perceptions of the cent advances in organization climate priority of safety at their unit and the theory and methodology. The first issue organization at large, especially in situa- concerns climate as a multilevel contions where safety competes with other struct. This is based on recent research performance facets such as care speed or indicating that, because the implementa-


(8, 9). However, the available scales over- nization (6, 10). Consequently, the prior-

ment's commitment to either one of The introduction of the concept of them is not necessarily the same. Second, safety in various high-risk sectors. It was developed for each professional group in manufacturing or service units perform- climate) regarding patient safety may be ing high-risk operations, the number of different. Therefore, healthcare climate fession-specific subclimates.

Climate scales should also reflect retion of policies and procedures in individ-Recognition of the importance of ual subunits requires substantial intersafety climate has led to the development pretation, there is significant variation in of several scales in the healthcare sector term of enacted policies across the orga-

Conclusions: The nursing climate identifies units where the likelihood of adverse events is greater or lower than the hospital's average. Such information can guide prevention efforts in selected units. These data encourage the development of additional climate subscales subsumed under the healthcare climate model (e.g., physicians subclimate). (Crit Care Med 2007; 35:1312–1317) **KEY WORDS: safety culture; human factors engineering; nursing**





"not enough money is being spent on safety, so be careful."

Take home message

we <u>can</u> change both the conditions under which health care professionals work and change their behavior to make them less error provoking.

Take home message

we can change both the conditions under which health care professionals work and change their behavior to make them less error provoking.

Creating safety climate and safety culture is our mission

OUR = ALL that serve in the health system from the head of the organization to last worker.



THANK YOU



